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Abstract:  
We study second-degree price discrimination for a congestible network good. We show 
that the seller does not always provide distinct contracts (i.e., it is not always optimal to 
price discriminate) and that it is more likely for the low-valuation buyer to be excluded. 
Because of the network externality through congestion, no buyer receives an efficient 
allocation. In particular, the high-valuation buyer might be offered a higher or a lower 
quality (relative to the first-degree price discrimination offer). Moreover, with congestion 
and for values of the parameters for which all types are serviced, consumer surplus 
under second-degree price discrimination may be greater than consumer surplus under 
no price discrimination. 
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the eﬀect of monopolistic second-degree price dis-
crimination of congestible network goods on behavior and payoﬀs, focusing
on the market for residential broadband service (RBB). In broadband net-
works, congestion arises when the network is over-utilized, resulting in a
degraded experience for consumers. The resulting interdependence of in-
dividual demands, via the existence of congestion externalities, limits the
applicability of standard results from the literature on price discrimination
to this market (Robinson, 1933; Schmalensee, 1981; Varian, 1985; Holmes,
1989).
The market for RBB is characterized by a unique set of features. Often
in any local area, a single provider of high-speed broadband service prac-
tices second-degree price discrimination by oﬀering consumers products dif-
ferentiated along at least one vertical dimension (i.e., tiers).1 These ver-
tical dimensions often include, but are not limited to, a provisioned speed
(i.e. bandwidth in megabits per second, Mb/s) and possibly a usage al-
lowance (i.e. permitted to consume a maximum number of gigabytes, GB,
per month). Our model allows for a single vertical dimension and assumes
that consumers’ utility and usage is increasing in this vertical dimension,
ultimately resulting in greater congestion.2
The prevalence of congestion in broadband networks depends on a number
of factors besides this vertical dimension.3 In broadband networks, a small
number of users (i.e., a neighborhood) share a ﬁxed amount of available
bandwidth at any time. If the network is inadequately provisioned for content
requests, congestion can arise and lead to saturation of critical links in the
1Detailed information on the number of broadband providers is available from the FCC
at http://transition.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/comp.html/. Very few areas are serviced by more
than one provider oﬀering downstream connections exceeding 3 Mb/s.
2Greater speed decreases the time required to access online content and allows the
user to access bandwidth-intensive applications, while a greater usage allowance reduces
the shadow price of consuming content throughout a billing cycle. Both aspects lead to
increased usage of RBB (Varian, 2001).
3See Clarke (2009) for a more detailed discussion of the structure of broadband networks
and precisely how congestion arises.
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network.4 This saturation can lead to delays in the transmission of data
packets, or even dropping of data packets. A user’s experience can deteriorate
rapidly with the proportion of packets dropped (or delayed), with over 2%
corresponding to a very poor experience. While the solution to congestion
seems to have an obvious answer, “build a bigger pipe”, it is not as simple
as it seems. There are a number of diﬃculties in properly provisioning a
broadband network. Over the past year alone, March 2011 to March 2012,
average usage grew by over 50%. Accurately forecasting this growth is a
diﬃcult problem, as the development of a single application (e.g. NetFlix)
can dramatically alter growth in usage. The size and discrete nature of the
investment required to split a network node makes responding quickly to
such innovations diﬃcult.
The small number and high geographical concentration of users along with
the timing of usage in broadband networks also presents diﬃculties for plan-
ning network investment. For any given number of users on a node, typically
between 300 and 500 in cable networks, it is diﬃcult to predict total usage due
to the large variance in usage across subscribers. The median user consumes
about 30GB of data per month, while users in the top 0.1% consume over
40 times (1.3 terabytes) as much. Figure 1 plots the average monthly usage
(GB), by quantile, for over 1 million broadband subscribers, across all tiers
and participating broadband providers. With such heterogeneity in usage,
even a “last-mile” network infrastructure that is over-provisioned can quickly
become congested with just a single heavy user moving into a neighborhood.
The geographically localized nature of broadband also makes day-to-day us-
age very unpredictable due to local shocks that drive usage. Poor weather
in a particular area, for example, may force individuals indoors and drive up
usage signiﬁcantly. Broadband networks must also accommodate the signif-
icant variation in usage throughout a day. Figure 2 shows that peak usage
is between 7pm and 11pm, when average usage is more than three times the
average the rest of the day. Collectively, these diﬃculties in accurately pro-
visioning a broadband network and the rapid growth in consumption, along
4Nodes that link users in a localized area to an interface, a link to the backbone of the
internet, are the ﬁrst place where congestion can arise.
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with pressures to minimize costs associated with infrastructure investment,
suggest that congestion in these types of networks will remain into the fore-
seeable future.
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Figure 2: Traﬃc by Time of Day
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We build an analytically tractable model that captures the important
features of the market for RBB: a small network of heterogeneous users facing
congestion externalities, and a monopolistic provider that practices second-
degree price discrimination via packages that are vertically diﬀerentiated (e.g.
usage allowance). After characterizing the unique optimal contract under
second-degree price discrimination with congestion, we study the eﬀect of
second-degree price discrimination on behavior and welfare.5
We ﬁrst show that congestion aﬀects the seller’s ability to oﬀer distinct
packages. If buyers are similar (but not identical) in their valuation of the
good, the seller cannot discriminate and oﬀers the same package to both
buyers. We then show that congestion results in ineﬃcient allocations for
both buyers. In particular, the well-known result of “no distortion at the top”
no longer holds once congestion externalities are introduced. The direction of
the distortion depends on the values of the parameters. We then show that
second-degree price discrimination may improve consumer surplus relative
to a baseline of no price discrimination for certain parameter values. While
this is true without congestion in situations in which the lower buyer is
excluded under no price discrimination and is oﬀered a package with price
discrimination, we show that this is true even when both buyers are serviced.
This runs counter to most arguments against price discrimination that focus
on the redistribution of consumer surplus to the ﬁrm. This result arises due
to the monopolist’s willingness to degrade quality for users generating low-
value traﬃc to limit the eﬀects of congestion experienced by users generating
high-value traﬃc.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and discusses a
model of second-degree price discrimination in which buyers face a congestion
cost. Section 3 studies the eﬀect of congestion on eﬃciency and consumer
surplus. Section 4 concludes the paper.
5See Czerny and Zhang (2012) for a study on the impact of third-degree price discrim-
ination by airlines on airports’ welfare-optimal congestion charges.
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2 Model and Optimal Behavior
Consider a monopolistic provider of residential broadband (RBB).6 The good
is assumed to be diﬀerentiated along a single vertical quality dimension.
In the US, this single vertical dimension is often a usage allowance (e.g.
allowance of 300GB per month) or provisioned speed (e.g. connection speed
in Mb/s), which have been shown empirically to increase usage (Varian,
2001).7 Because the RBB framework is a relevant and important application,
we now use the term usage allowance instead of quality for the remainder of
the paper. Speciﬁcally, the seller oﬀers a package with usage allowance q ≥ 0
and charges a ﬂat fee t ≥ 0 for access to the network.
To account for the fact that buyers are part of small networks and have
diﬀerent valuations for internet services, we suppose that there are only two
heterogeneous buyers. Buyer L has a lower valuation for the internet service
than buyer H . Each buyer derives utility from access to the network, but
also receives disutility from the congestion in the network. If buyers L and
H accept packages {qL, tL} and {qH , tH}, respectively, net utility of buyer L
is
uL = αqL − q2L − c(qL + qH)qL, (1)
while net utility of buyer H is
uH = qH − q2H − c(qL + qH)qH , (2)
where the parameter α ∈ (0, 1) reﬂects heterogeneity among buyers. The
quadratic speciﬁcation for utility is similar to that of Lambrecht et al. (2007).
The average congestion cost c(qL + qH) is increasing in total usage qL + qH ,
and the parameter c ≥ 0 measures the degree of disutility due to congestion.
Because the seller is unable to perfectly price discriminate, we consider
optimal behavior of the seller under second-degree price discrimination. The
6Markets are often local monopolies. See the FCC’s National Broadband Plan at
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf.
7Increased speed expands the set of applications and reduces the time required to
access content, while a higher usage allowance relaxes the shadow price of consumption
throughout a billing cycle.
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seller proposes two packages so that each type of buyer prefers the package
intended for him. Deﬁnition 2.1 presents the seller’s maximization problem
under second-degree price discrimination. There are two sorts of constraints.
The incentive compatibility constraints state that each buyer prefers the
package designed for him. The individual rationality constraints ensure that
each buyer accepts his designated package.
Deﬁnition 2.1. Under second-degree price discrimination, the seller solves
the following program:
Π∗∗(α, c) = max
qL,qH ,tL,tH≥0
tL + tH (3)
subject to the incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR) con-
straints, i.e.,
(IC) : αqL − q2L − c(qL + qH)qL − tL ≥ αqH − q2H − c(qH + qH)qH − tH , (4)
(IC) : qH − q2H − c(qL + qH)qH − tH ≥ qL − q2L − c(qL + qL)qL − tL. (5)
and
(IR) : αqL − q2L − c(qL + qH)qL ≥ tL, (6)
(IR) : qH − q2H − c(qL + qH)qH ≥ tH . (7)
To ensure the existence of an interior solution, we assume that the con-
gestion cost is not too high.8 Assumption 2.2 holds for the remainder of the
paper.
Assumption 2.2. c ∈ [0, 2
9
(1 +
√
10)
]
, such that 4(1 + c)− 9c2 > 0.
Proposition 2.3 provides optimal packages under second-degree price dis-
crimination. The types of packages oﬀered to the buyers depend on the rel-
ative valuation of buyer L and the congestion cost parameter. The optimal
packages stated in Proposition 2.3 embed the standard case with no conges-
tion, i.e., c = 0. Throughout the paper, we study the eﬀect of congestion by
comparing our results to the benchmark case c = 0.
8See Footnote 19 in Appendix A.
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Proposition 2.3. Under second-degree price discrimination,
1. For α ∈
(
0, 2+5c
4(1+c)
]
, the seller oﬀers {q∗∗L , t∗∗L } = {0, 0} and
{q∗∗H , t∗∗H } =
{
1
2(1 + c)
,
1
4(1 + c)
}
. (8)
2. For α ∈
(
2+5c
4(1+c)
, 2(1+2c)
2+5c
)
, the seller oﬀers9
q∗∗L =
2(2α− 1)− (5− 4α)c
4(1 + c)− 9c2 , (9)
and
q∗∗H =
2− 3(2α− 1)c
4(1 + c)− 9c2 . (10)
3. For α ∈
[
2(1+2c)
2+5c
, 1
)
, c > 0 the seller oﬀers the same package to both
buyers,
{q∗∗, t∗∗} =
{
α
2(1 + 2c)
,
α2
4(1 + 2c)
}
, (11)
Proof. See Appendix A.
To see more clearly how optimal usage allowances are inﬂuenced by the
parameters of the model, we plot q∗∗L and q
∗∗
H as functions of α and c. Figure 3
provides both a contour plot and a three-dimensional view of q∗∗L and q
∗∗
H . The
three-dimensional view gives information about the magnitude of the eﬀects
of the parameters on optimal usage allowances. For any buyer, regardless
of congestion (and as long as a buyer is oﬀered a positive usage allowance),
usage allowance is decreasing in the congestion cost. Moreover, an increase
in buyer L’s valuation increases his usage allowance.
9The expressions for t∗∗L and t
∗∗
H are cumbersome and omitted for this case. See Ap-
pendix A.
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Figure 3a: Contour of q∗∗L
q∗∗L = 0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
c
α
Figure 3b: Contour of q∗∗H
Figure 3: Optimal Usage Allowances. For Figures 3a and b, a contour plot
reads similarly to an indiﬀerence curve in a utility graph. A curve on the graph
regroups the set of pairs {α, c} that yields identical optimal allowances. The arrows
indicates the direction for an increase in the value of usage allowances. Figures
3c and d complement Figures 3a and b by providing a three-dimensional view of
usage allowances.
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Congestion adds a link between buyer L’s valuation and the usage al-
lowance received by buyer H . Indeed, when both buyers are oﬀered positive
usage allowances, then an increase in buyer L’s valuation reduces the usage
allowance oﬀered to buyer H . Indeed, while an increase in α induces the
seller to oﬀer a higher usage allowance to buyer L, it also increases conges-
tion cost for both buyers, which reduces the usage allowance oﬀered to buyer
H .
Remark 2.4. From Proposition 2.3, for c > 0 and α ∈
(
2+5c
4(1+c)
, 2(1+2c)
2+5c
)
,
∂q∗∗H
∂α
< 0.
Having characterized analytically and graphically the optimal packages
oﬀered by the seller, we now discuss how congestion aﬀects the seller’s deci-
sion to eﬀectively price discriminate (i.e., to oﬀer distinct packages) and to
service both buyers. Graphically, from Figure 4, the set of values for α for
which the seller oﬀers diﬀerent and positive usage allowances is shrinking in
c and vanishes for large values of c.
First, Remark 2.5 states that the presence of congestion (i.e., c > 0) af-
fects the seller’s ability to oﬀer distinct packages. Although the seller never
oﬀers a greater usage allowance to the low-valuation buyer, it could be the
same.10 Consistent with Proposition 2.3, under second-degree price discrimi-
nation with a congestion cost, the seller cannot oﬀer two distinct qualities for
higher values of α, and hence q∗∗L = q
∗∗
H . If buyers are similar (but not iden-
tical) in their valuation of the good, the seller cannot discriminate and oﬀers
the same package to both buyers. For intermediate values of α, the seller
does oﬀer two diﬀerent packages while servicing both buyers, i.e., q∗∗H > q
∗∗
L .
Finally, for low values of α, the seller excludes the low-valuation buyer.
10As depicted in Figures 8 and 9 in Appendix D, an increase in the parameter for
congestion cost or an increase in buyer L’s valuation reduces the diﬀerence between usage
allowances. While the seller never oﬀers a better usage allowance to buyer L, the distance
between the two usage allowances depends on buyer L’s valuation and the congestion cost
parameter.
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Figure 4: Types of Packages. The seller oﬀers diﬀerent types of packages de-
pending on the values for the pair {α, c}. The dotted lines separate the three cases.
Consistent with Proposition 2.3, the increasing concave dotted line is α = 2+5c4(1+c) ,
while the decreasing convex dotted line is α = 2(1+2c)2+5c . The area buyer L is
excluded regroups the set of pairs {α, c} for which q∗∗H > q∗∗L = 0. The area L
and H consume diﬀerent packages regroups the set of pairs {α, c} for which
q∗∗H > q
∗∗
L > 0. The area L and H consume same package regroups the set of
pairs {α, c} for which q∗∗H = q∗∗L > 0.
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Remark 2.5. From Proposition 2.3, 0 ≤ q∗∗L ≤ q∗∗L < 1/2. Moreover, for
c > 0,
1. for α ∈
(
0, 2(1+2c)
2+5c
)
two diﬀerent packages are oﬀered.
2. For α ∈
[
2(1+2c)
2+5c
, 1
)
, only one package is oﬀered to both buyers.
To explain the seller’s decision to oﬀer the same package with heteroge-
neous buyers, recall Remark 2.4. When there is congestion and both buyers
are serviced, the usage allowance oﬀered to buyer H is decreasing in buyer
L’s valuation. For high enough values of α, this negative externality on buyer
H implies that usage allowance are arbitrarily close to each other so that the
seller oﬀers only one type of package to both buyers.11 See also Figure 8 in
Appendix D.
Remark 2.6 states that the seller’s ability to serve both buyers depends
on the congestion cost. An increase in the congestion cost c increases the
threshold for buyer L to be excluded. See also Figure 9 in Appendix D.
Remark 2.6. From Proposition 2.3, an increase in the congestion cost makes
it more likely for buyer L to be excluded, i.e., it increases the range of values
for α for which buyer L is excluded.
3 Eﬀect of Congestion
Having characterized and discussed how the seller’s behavior changes with
congestion, we now study the eﬀect of congestion cost on eﬃciency and con-
sumer surplus.
3.1 Eﬃciency
We show that a positive cost of congestion has a profound eﬀect on eﬃ-
ciency, i.e., in general no buyer receives the eﬃcient allocation. We begin by
11Oﬀering more usage allowance to buyer L than to buyer H is not optimal for the
seller. See Appendix A.
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providing the optimal usage allowances under ﬁrst-degree (perfect) price dis-
crimination in Proposition 3.1. We then compare perfect and second-degree
price discrimination.
Proposition 3.1. Under perfect price discrimination, q∗H > q
∗
L ≥ 0 such
that
1. For α ∈ (0, c
1+c
]
, q∗L = 0 and
q∗H =
1
2(1 + c)
. (12)
2. For α ∈ ( c
1+c
, 1
)
,
q∗L =
α− (1− α)c
2(1 + 2c)
, (13)
q∗H =
1 + (1− α)c
2(1 + 2c)
. (14)
Proof. See Appendix B for a full-characterization and the proof for the case
of perfect price discrimination.
Proposition 3.2 states that when the seller services both buyers under
perfect and second-degree price discrimination, there is in general a distortion
for buyer H .12 The ineﬃciency due to congestion can either increase of
decrease usage allowance depending on the values of the parameters.
12When buyer L is excluded under second-degree price discrimination, then q∗∗H > q
∗
H
and 0 = q∗∗L ≤ q∗L with equality in some cases.
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Proposition 3.2. Suppose that the seller services both buyer under perfect
and second-degree price discrimination, i.e., α ∈
(
2+5c
4(1+c)
, 1
)
. Then, for c >
0,13
1. For α ∈
(
2+5c
4(1+c)
, 17c+9c
2+6
20c+9c2+8
)
, q∗∗H > q
∗
H .
2. For α = 17c+9c
2+6
20c+9c2+8
, q∗∗H = q
∗
H .
3. For α ∈
(
17c+9c2+6
20c+9c2+8
, 1
)
, q∗∗H < q
∗
H .
Proof. From Propositions 2.3 and 3.1, comparing (10) and (14) yields the
conditions stated in Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.3 states the direction of the ineﬃciency for buyer L’s usage
allowance. When the seller oﬀers the same package to both buyers under
second-degree price discrimination, the distortion is downward (i.e., q∗∗L <
q∗L). However, when the seller oﬀers diﬀerent packages under second-degree
price discrimination, the distortion is upward (i.e., q∗∗L > q
∗
L).
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that the seller services both buyers under perfect
and second-degree price discrimination, i.e., α ∈
(
2+5c
4(1+c)
, 1
)
. Then, for c >
0,14
1. For α ∈
(
2+5c
4(1+c)
, 2∗1+2c)
2+5c
)
, q∗∗L < q
∗
L.
2. For α ∈
(
2∗1+2c)
2+5c
, 1
)
, q∗∗L > q
∗
L.
Proof. From Propositions 2.3 and 3.1, comparing (9) and (13) yields the
conditions stated in Proposition 3.3.
The conditions stated in Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 are depicted in Figures 5
and 6. Speciﬁcally, Figures 5 and 6 orders the pair {q∗∗H , q∗H} and {q∗∗H , q∗H},
respectively for diﬀerent values of the pair {α, c}.15 As in Figure 4, the dot-
ted lines represent the boundaries for the diﬀerent types of packages oﬀered
13The conditions stated below are not valid when evaluated at c = 0.
14The conditions stated below are not valid when evaluated at c = 0.
15See Figures 10 and 11 in Appendix D for the size of these diﬀerences for buyer H and
buyer L, respectively.
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Figure 5: Eﬃciency for Buyer H ’s Usage Allowance. The area q∗∗H < q
∗
H
regroups the set of pairs {α, c} for which the ineﬃciency decreases buyer H’s
usage allowance. The area q∗∗H > q
∗
H regroups the set of pairs {α, c} for which
the ineﬃciency increases buyer H’s usage allowance. The thick solid increasing
concave line represents the case in which there is eﬃciency with congestion. There
is also eﬃciency for the benchmark case of no congestion at c = 0.
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Figure 6: Eﬃciency for Buyer L’s Usage Allowance. The area q∗∗L > q
∗
L > 0
regroups the set of pairs {α, c} for which the ineﬃciency increases buyer L’s usage
allowance. The area 0 < q∗∗L < q
∗
L regroups the set of pairs {α, c} for which the
ineﬃciency decreases buyer L’s usage allowance including the benchmark case of
no congestion for c = 0, and α ∈ (1/2, 1). The thick solid decreasing convex line
represents the case in which there is eﬃciency
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under second-degree price discrimination. Above the dotted increasing con-
vex line, both buyers are oﬀered positive usage allowances under perfect and
second-degree price discrimination. Past the dotted decreasing concave line,
as stated earlier, second-degree price discrimination implies that the seller
oﬀers the same package. The thick solid line represents the case in which the
outcome is eﬃcient.
3.2 Consumer Surplus
Having discussed the issue of eﬃciency by comparing ﬁrst-degree and second-
degree price discrimination, we now examine whether price discrimination
can enhance consumer surplus when there is congestion. To that end, we
compare second-degree price discrimination with the case in which the seller
does not price discriminate. See Appendix C for the full characterization and
discussion of optimal packages under no price discrimination. We show that
consumer surplus (through an increase in buyer H ’s consumer surplus since
buyer L’s consumer surplus is always zero regardless of price discrimination)
may increase when the seller price discriminates. Figure 7 depicts the eﬀect
of price discrimination on consumer surplus for diﬀerent values of α and
c. The hat sign refers to the case of no price discrimination. Let CS∗∗ =
u∗∗H − t∗∗H and ĈS = uˆH − tˆH be the consumer surplus under second-degree
price discrimination and no price discrimination, respectively.16
Remark 3.4 states that when the seller oﬀers diﬀerent packages to both
buyers under second-degree price discrimination (recall Figure 4) and both
buyers are serviced under no price discrimination (i.e., areas A2 and A3 in
Figure 7), the eﬀect on consumer surplus may be positive or negative. In
areas A2 and A3, price discrimination yields an increase in buyer H ’s usage
allowance and a decrease in buyer L’s usage allowance, while the sum of the
two usage allowances increases. The increase in usage allowance leads to an
increase in buyer H ’s gross beneﬁts (i.e., uH − tH). The increase in overall
usage allowance leads to an increase as well in the congestion cost. In areaA2,
buyer H ’s gross beneﬁt increases more than the congestion cost, and, thus,
16Recall that u∗∗L − t∗∗L = uˆL − tˆL = 0.
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Figure 7: Eﬀect of Price Discrimination on Consumer Surplus. For i =
1, 2, 3, 5, area Ai regroups the set of pairs {α, c} for diﬀerent cases for the eﬀect
of congestion on consumer surplus. Area A1: Buyer L is never excluded, q∗∗H =
q∗∗L = qˆ, and CS
∗∗ = ĈS. Area A2: Buyer L is never excluded, q∗∗H > qˆ > q∗∗L , and
CS∗∗ > ĈS. Area A3: Buyer L is never excluded, q∗∗H > qˆ > q∗∗L , and CS∗∗ < ĈS.
Areas A4 and A5: Buyer L is excluded in the case of no price discrimination,
q∗∗H < qˆ, q
∗∗
L > 0, and CS
∗∗ > ĈS.
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consumer surplus increases. In area A3, buyer H ’s gross beneﬁt increases
less than the congestion cost, and, thus, consumer surplus decreases.
Remark 3.4. From Figure 7, when both buyers are serviced under no price
discrimination and the seller oﬀers diﬀerent packages under second-degree
price discrimination, then price discrimination
1. increases consumer surplus in area A2, and
2. decreases consumer surplus in area A3.
Remark 3.5 states that the possibility to price discriminate may have no
eﬀect on consumer surplus. Since with congestion, the seller may decide to
oﬀer the same package to both buyers under second-degree price discrimina-
tion (Recall Figure 4), and, thus, there is no diﬀerence with the case of no
price discrimination.
Remark 3.5. From Figure 7, when both buyers are serviced under no price
discrimination, second-degree price discrimination has no eﬀect on consumer
surplus in area A1.
Remark 3.6 recalls the standard positive eﬀect of price discrimination on
consumer surplus when the seller excludes buyer L under no price discrimi-
nation. This eﬀect is present regardless of congestion.
Remark 3.6. From Figure 7, when buyer L is excluded under no price dis-
crimination, second-degree price discrimination increases consumer surplus
in areas A4 and A5.
In area A4, the increase is due to an increase of the gross beneﬁt and, if
there is congestion, a decrease of the congestion cost. Here, buyer L is oﬀered
a higher usage allowance while buyer H ’s usage allowance is reduced under
second-degree price discrimination (compared to no price discrimination).
Since the congestion cost borne by buyer H is more aﬀected by his own
usage allowance than buyer L’s usage allowance, congestion cost decreases
for buyer H . The fee charged to buyer H is also reduced so that gross
beneﬁt increases. In area A4, and in no price discrimination, buyer L is
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excluded, and the seller extracts most of buyer H ’s surplus. Under second-
degree price discrimination, buyer L is not excluded, and the seller captures
less of buyer H ’s utility. The overall result in area A4 is an increase in the
consumer surplus. In area A5, both gross beneﬁt and congestion cost increase
with price discrimination. In comparison with area A4, α is relatively low.
Therefore, the variation of q∗∗L and q
∗∗
H observed in area A4 is attenuated in
area A5.17 As a consequence, the congestion cost increases. However, the
increase in the gross beneﬁt overcomes the increase in the congestion cost.
4 Final Remarks
In this paper, we provide an analysis of second-degree price discrimination for
congestible network goods. We show that the seller does not always provide
distinct contracts (i.e., it is not always optimal to price discriminate). We
also show that congestion makes it impossible to obtain eﬃcient allocations
for any buyers. Finally, with congestion and for values of the parameters
for which all types are serviced, consumer surplus under second-degree price
discrimination may be greater than consumer surplus under no price discrim-
ination. The existence of a region of the parameter space that generates con-
sumer welfare-improving second-degree price discrimination, suggests room
for additional empirical work studying demand for internet access and con-
tent. To date, with the exception of a few studies (Varian, 2001; Goolsbee
and Klenow, 2006; Lambrecht et al., 2007), there is very little known about
the eﬃciency properties of usage allowances and more generally 3-part tariﬀ
pricing schedules. Given the continual increasing importance of the internet,
understanding and characterizing demand for internet content is an impor-
tant ﬁrst step to achieving eﬃciency in broadband networks.
As a ﬁrst step in studying price discrimination of a congestible network
good, we have abstracted from the buyer’s usage decision once usage al-
lowance is chosen and ignored a richer pricing scheme with a variable com-
ponent linked to usage.18 Future research should consider a three-stage game
17Remember that q∗∗L is increasing in α and q
∗∗
H is decreasing in α.
18As noted previously, usage allowance (e.g. allowance of 300GB per month) has been
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in which decisions on usage allowance and usage are split. In the ﬁrst stage,
the seller oﬀers several internet packages. In the second stage, the buyers
choose one of the two packages. In the third stage, the consumers interact
strategically by choosing their usage levels. This would further our under-
standing on price discrimination when buyers choose both a type of service
and a level of consumption.
shown empirically to increase usage (Varian, 2001).
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A Second-Degree Price Discrimination
In this appendix, we provide a proof of Proposition 2.3. Using (4) and (5),
it follows that
αqL − q2L − cqL(qL + qH)− tL
+ qH − q2H − cqH(qL + qH)− tH
≥ αqH − q2H − cqH(qH + qH)− tH
+ qL − q2L − cqL(qL + qL)− tL, (15)
so that
(qH − qL)(1− α) + c(qH − qL)2 ≥ 0. (16)
If c = 0, then, from (16), qH ≥ qL. If c > 0, then we need to consider three
cases. 1) If qH > qL, then (16) implies that
qH > qL − 1− α
c
, (17)
which is always true when qH ≥ qL. 2) If qH = qL, then (16) holds. 3) If
qH < qL, then (16) implies that the condition
qH +
1− α
c
< qL (18)
must hold as well.
1. Suppose ﬁrst that qH > qL.
(a) At the optimum, (6) is active. To see this, using (5), α ∈ (0, 1),
and qH > qL, it follows that
qH − q2H − cqH(qL + qH)− tH ≥ qL − q2L − cqL(qL + qL)− tL,
(19)
≥ αqL − q2L − cqL(qL + qH)− tL.
(20)
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Suppose to the contrary that (6) is inactive, i.e., αqL−q2L−cqL(qL+
qH)− tL > 0, then so is (7). This cannot be an optimum since tL
and tH can be increased without any eﬀect on incentive compati-
bility and individual rationality. Hence, (6) is active, i.e.,
tL = αqL − q2L − cqL(qL + qH), (21)
= αqL − (1 + c)q2L − cqLqH (22)
at the optimum.
(b) At the optimum, (5) is active. To see this, using (19) and (22),
qH − q2H − cqH(qL + qH)− tH ≥ qL − q2L − cqL(qL + qL)− tL,
(23)
≥ αqL − q2L − cqL(qL + qH)− tL = 0.
(24)
Suppose to the contrary that (5) is inactive, i.e., qH−q2H−cqH(qL+
qH)− tH > qL − q2L − cqL(qL + qL)− tL, then tH can be increased
without any eﬀect on incentive compatibility or individual ratio-
nality. Hence, from (5),
qH − q2H − cqH(qL + qH)− tH = qL − q2L − cqL(qL + qL)− tL, (25)
so that
tH = qH − (1 + c)q2H − (1− α)qL + cq2L − 2cqHqL (26)
at the optimum.
(c) Expressions (4) and (7) can be neglected.
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(d) Plugging (22) and (26) into (3) yields
Π∗∗(α, c) = max
qL,qH≥0
αqL − (1 + c)q2L − cqLqH + qH − (1 + c)q2H
− (1− α)qL + cq2L − 2cqHqL, (27)
= max
qL,qH≥0
(2α− 1)qL − q2L + qH − (1 + c)q2H − 3cqHqL.
(28)
We consider two subcases.
• Suppose ﬁrst that α ∈
(
2+5c
4(1+c)
, 2(1+2c)
2+5c
)
. Then, the ﬁrst-order
conditions are19
∂
∂qL
: 2α− 1− 2qL − 3cqH = 0, (30)
∂
∂qH
: 1− 2(1 + c)qH − 3cqL = 0. (31)
Solving (30) and (31) yields (9) and (10) such that q∗∗H > q
∗∗
L >
0 when α ∈
(
2+5c
4(1+c)
, 2(1+2c)
2+5c
)
.20
• Suppose next that α ∈
(
0, 2+5c
4(1+c)
]
. Then, q∗∗L = 0, and,
from (28) evaluated at qL = 0, the ﬁrst-order condition is
∂
∂qH
: 1− 2(1 + c)qH = 0, (32)
which yields q∗∗H =
1
2(1+c)
, so that, using (26), t∗∗H =
1
4(1+c)
, as
in (8)
2. Before considering the case α ∈
[
2(1+2c)
2+5c
, 1
)
, we show that qH < qL is
not possible in equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that qH < qL.
19Given Assumption 2.2, the Hessian matrix
H =
[ −2 −3c
−3c −2(1 + c)
]
(29)
is negative deﬁnite.
20Here, α > 2+5c4(1+c) implies that q
∗∗
L > 0, while α <
2(1+2c)
2+5c implies that q
∗∗
H > q
∗∗
L .
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(a) At the optimum, (7) is active. To see this, using (4) and the fact
that α ∈ (0, 1) and that (18) must hold in this case, it follows that
αqL − q2L − cqL(qL + qH)− tL ≥ αqH − q2H − cqH(qH + qH)− tH ,
(33)
> qH − q2H − cqH(qH + qL)− tH .
(34)
Suppose to the contrary that (7) is inactive, i.e., qH−q2H−cqH(qH+
qL)− tH > 0, then so is (6). This cannot be an optimum since tL
and tH can be increased without any eﬀect on incentive compati-
bility and individual rationality. Hence, (7) is active, i.e.,
tH = qH − q2H − cqH(qH + qL), (35)
= qH − (1 + c)q2H − cqLqH (36)
at the optimum.
(b) At the optimum, (4) is active. To see this, using (34) and (36),
αqL − q2L − cqL(qL + qH)− tL ≥ αqH − q2H − cqH(qH + qH)− tH ,
(37)
≥ qH − q2H − cqH(qH + qL)− tH = 0.
(38)
Suppose to the contrary that (4) is inactive, i.e., αqL−q2L−cqL(qL+
qH)− tL > αqH−q2H −cqH(qH+qH)− tH , then tL can be increased
without any eﬀect on incentive compatibility or individual ratio-
nality. Hence,
αqL−q2L−cqL(qL+qH)−tL = αqH−q2H−cqH(qH+qH)−tH , (39)
so that
tL = αqL − (1 + c)q2L + (1− α)qH + cq2H − 2cqLqH . (40)
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(c) Plugging (36) and (40) into (3) yields
Π∗∗(α, c) = max
qL,qH
αqL − (1 + c)q2L + (1− α)qH + cq2H − 2cqLqH
+ qH − (1 + c)q2H − cqLqH , (41)
= max
qL,qH
αqL − (1 + c)q2L + (2− α)qH − q2H − 3cqLqH .
(42)
We consider two subcases.
• Suppose ﬁrst that q∗∗L > q∗∗H > 0. Then, the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions are
∂
∂qL
: α− 2(1 + c)qL − 3cqH = 0, (43)
∂
∂qH
: 2− α− 2qH − 3cqL = 0, (44)
so that
q∗∗L =
2α− 3(2− α)c
4(1 + c)− 9c2 , (45)
q∗∗H =
2(2− α) + (4− 5α)c
4(1 + c)− 9c2 . (46)
Given (18), we need
q∗∗H +
1− α
c
< q∗∗L (47)
or 8(1− α)c+ (1 + α)c2 + 4(1− α) < 0, which is impossible.
• Suppose next that q∗∗L > q∗∗H = 0. Then, the ﬁrst-order condi-
tion is
∂
∂qL
: α− 2(1 + c)qL = 0, (48)
so that
q∗∗L =
α
2(1 + c)
, (49)
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and thus proﬁt is
Π∗∗(α, c) =
α2
4(1 + c)
. (50)
However, this cannot be an optimum since the solution q∗∗H =
1
2(1+c)
, q∗∗L = 0, t
∗∗
L = 0 and t
∗∗
H =
1
4(1+c)
yields proﬁt 1
4(1+c)
that is strictly greater than (50).
3. Suppose ﬁnally that α ∈
[
2(1+2c)
2+5c
, 1
)
. Since q∗∗H > q
∗∗
L cannot hold,
and q∗∗H < q
∗∗
L is not possible, it must be that q
∗∗
H = q
∗∗
L . Hence, (3) is
rewritten as
Π∗∗(α, c) = max
q
2(αq − (1 + 2c)q2), (51)
which yields (11).
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B First-Degree Price Discrimination
In this appendix, we state and prove the optimal contract under ﬁrst-degree
(perfect) price discrimination. Suppose that the seller can perfectly price
discriminate. Hence, he solves the following program
Π∗(α, c) = max
qL,qH ,tL,tH≥0
tL + tH , (52)
subject to the IR (individual rationality) constraints
(IR) : αqL − q2L − c(qL + qH)qL ≥ tL, (53)
(IR) : qH − q2H − c(qL + qH)qH ≥ tH . (54)
Proposition B.1 provides the optimal packages under perfect price dis-
crimination.
Proposition B.1. Under perfect price discrimination, q∗H > q
∗
L ≥ 0 and
t∗H > t
∗
L ≥ 0, such that
1. For α ∈ (0, c
1+c
]
, {q∗L, t∗L} = {0, 0} and
{q∗H , t∗H} =
{
1
2(1 + c)
,
1
4(1 + c)
}
, (55)
and
2. For α ∈ ( c
1+c
, 1
)
,
{q∗L, t∗L} =
{
α− (1− α)c
2(1 + 2c)
,
α2 − (1− α)αc
4(1 + 2c)
}
, (56)
{q∗H , t∗H} =
{
1 + (1− α)c
2(1 + 2c)
,
1 + (1− α)c
4(1 + 2c)
}
. (57)
Proof. Since both (53) and (54) are active, (52) is rewritten as
Π∗(α, c) = max
qL,qH≥0
αqL − q2L + qH − q2H − c(qL + qH)2. (58)
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1. Suppose ﬁrst that α ∈ (0, c
1+c
]
. Then, q∗L = 0, and, thus t
∗
L = 0.
From (58) evaluated at qL = 0, the ﬁrst-order condition is
∂
∂qH
: 1− 2qH − 2cqH = 0, (59)
which yields qH =
1+(1−α)c
2(1+2c)
and t∗H =
1+(1−α)c
4(1+2c)
, as in (55).
2. Suppose next that α ∈ ( c
1+c
, 1
)
. Then, the unique interior solution is
characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions21
∂
∂qL
: α− 2qL − 2c(qL + qH) = 0, (60)
∂
∂qH
: 1− 2qH − 2c(qL + qH) = 0. (61)
Solving (60) and (61) yields q∗L and q
∗
H as in (56) and (57) such that
q∗L > 0 when α ∈
(
c
1+c
, 1
)
. Plugging back q∗L and q
∗
H into (53) and (54)
yields t∗L and t
∗
H as in (56) and (57).
21The Hessian matrix H = −2
[
1 + c c
c 1 + c
]
is negative deﬁnite.
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C No Price Discrimination
Suppose that the seller cannot price discriminate among the two buyers.
Then, he proposes the same package {q, t} to both buyers, and he solves the
following program:
Πˆ = max
q,t≥0
t1[uL(q,q)≥t] + t1[uH(q,q)≥t] (62)
Here, 1[·] is an indicator function equal to one if the statement in [·] is true,
and zero otherwise.
Proposition C.1 provides the optimal solutions for the case in which the
seller cannot price discriminate. For low values of α, the low-valuation buyer
is excluded. Because the low-valuation buyer does not value the good (α is
low), he will not be disposed to pay a high ﬂat fee. As a consequence, selling
to the low-valuation buyer will not be proﬁtable for the seller. For high values
of α, both buyers accept to consume the good. The presence of a congestion
cost renders ﬁrst-degree price discrimination more diﬃcult. Speciﬁcally, as
heterogeneity between the two buyers increases (i.e., a decrease in α), the
seller ﬁnds it more costly to oﬀer a non-zero contract to the low-valuation
buyer. The reason is that oﬀering an extra unit of usage to the low-valuation
buyer yields extra revenue that is dominated by the extra congestion cost. An
increase in the cost of congestion makes it more likely for the low-valuation
buyer to be excluded as well.
Proposition C.1. Suppose the seller cannot price discriminate.
1. For α ∈
(
0,
√
1+2c
2(1+c)
]
, the seller excludes the low-valuation buyer and
service the high-valuation buyer by oﬀering quality
qˆ =
1
2(1 + c)
(63)
for a fee
tˆ =
1
4(1 + c)
. (64)
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The seller’s payoﬀ (or social welfare) is
Πˆ = Wˆ =
1
4(1 + c)
. (65)
2. For α ∈
(√
1+2c
2(1+c)
, 1
)
, the seller services both buyers by oﬀering quality
qˆ =
α
2(1 + 2c)
(66)
for a fee
tˆ =
α2
4(1 + 2c)
. (67)
The seller’s payoﬀ is
Πˆ =
α2
2(1 + 2c)
, (68)
while welfare is
Wˆ =
α
2(1 + 2c)
. (69)
Proof. We solve the problem piecewise. The seller will not propose {q, t}
such that uL(q, q) < t and uH(q, q) < t. We then distinguish two cases:
uL(q, q) < t ≤ uH(q, q) and t ≤ uL(q, q) < uH(q, q).
1. Case 1: uL(q, q) < t ≤ uH(q, q). The low-valuation buyer does not
accept the oﬀer, so that the congestion cost is simply cq2, then the
utility of the high-valuation buyer is uH(q, q) = q−q2−cq2 ≥ t. At the
optimum, uH(q, q) = t because if uH(q, q) > t the seller can increase t
without aﬀecting the constraints. The seller’s program is rewritten as
Πˆ = max
q≥0
q − q2 − cq2, (70)
so that the ﬁrst-order condition is ∂
∂q
: 1− 2q − 2cq = 0, which yields
qˆ =
1
2(1 + c)
(71)
The buyers’ utilities are uL(qˆ, qˆ) = 0 and uH(qˆ, qˆ) = tˆ =
1
4(1+c)
. The
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seller’s proﬁt Πˆ and the social welfare Wˆ are
Πˆ = Wˆ =
1
4(1 + c)
. (72)
2. Case 2: t ≤ uL(q, q) < uH(q, q). Both buyers accept the package {q, t}.
uL(q, q) = αq− q2− c(q+ q)q, and uH(q, q) = q− q2− c(q+ q)q. At the
optimum, uL(q, q) = t because if uL(q, q) > t the seller can increase t
without aﬀecting the constraints. The seller’s program is rewritten as
Πˆ = max
q≥0
2(αq − q2 − cq(q + q)), (73)
so that the ﬁrst-order condition is ∂
∂q
: α− 2(1+ 2c)q = 0, which yields
qˆ =
α
2(1 + 2c)
, (74)
Hence,
Πˆ =
α2
2(1 + 2c)
. (75)
and
Wˆ = uˆH + uˆL, (76)
=
α
2(1 + 2c)
. (77)
3. It follows that the low-valuation buyer is excluded if and only if (72)
is greater than (75), i.e., α ∈
(
0,
√
1+2c
2(1+c)
]
.
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D Figures
Figures 8 and 9 provide information about the partial eﬀects of α and c,
respectively, on optimal usage allowance under second-degree price discrimi-
nation, holding constant the other parameter.
Figures 10 and 11 provide a general three-dimensional view of the diﬀer-
ence in usage allowance under perfect price discrimination and second-degree
price discrimination.
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Figure 8a: c = 0
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Figure 8d: c = 0.9
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q**H
Figure 8: Eﬀect of Buyer L’s Valuation on Usage Allowances. The optimal
usage allowances q∗∗L and q
∗∗
H under second-degree price discrimination are plotted
as functions of α ∈ [0, 1] for diﬀerent values of c ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. An increase in
α reduces the diﬀerence in usage allowances between the two types of buyers.
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Figure 9a: α=0.5
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Figure 9d: α=0.9
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Figure 9: Eﬀect of Congestion Cost on Usage Allowances. The optimal usage
allowances q∗∗L and q
∗∗
H under second-degree price discrimination are plotted as
functions of c ∈ [0, c¯] for diﬀerent values of α ∈ {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.9}. An increase in
c reduces the diﬀerence in usage allowances between the two types of buyers.
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Figure 10: Eﬃciency for Buyer H ’s Usage Allowance, 3D. A three-dimensional
view of the diﬀerence in buyer H’s usage allowances between second-degree and
perfect price discrimination is provided. That is, q∗∗H − q∗H is plotted for all values
of α and c.
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Figure 11: Eﬃciency for Buyer L’s Usage Allowance, 3D. A three-dimensional
view of the diﬀerence in buyer L’s usage allowances between second-degree and
perfect price discrimination is provided. That is, q∗∗L − q∗L is plotted for all values
of α and c.
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